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DOMESTIC VIOLENCE LAWS 
BETH GOLDSTEIN LEWIS TRIMMER* 
Under Alaska domestic violence laws, two individuals who have 
engaged in a “sexual relationship” are “household members.”  
The Alaska Legislature, however, has left the term “sexual 
relationship” undefined.  This Comment sets out to define the 
term.  Finding no answer in the legislative history and common 
meaning of a sexual relationship, the Comment concludes that the 
Alaska Legislature needs to take steps to more clearly define what 
constitutes a “sexual relationship” for the purposes of the 
domestic violence laws.  Action on the part of the legislature is 
even more important, this Comment suggests, because a number 
of criminal, civil, and interpretive consequences may arise from 
the failure to define “sexual relationship.” 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
“Domestic violence,” as defined in section 18.66.990 of the 
Alaska Statutes,1 has a potentially far-reaching meaning.  
According to subsection three of the statute, the terms “domestic 
violence” and “crime involving domestic violence” are crimes 
committed by one “householder member” against another.2  Such 
crimes range in severity from homicide, murder, and sexual 
offenses to criminal trespass and harassment.3  The far-reaching 
implications of Alaska’s domestic violence laws rest not only on the 
broad list of crimes encompassed by the statute, but also by the 
Alaska Legislature’s expansive definition of “household member.”4  
Under section 18.66.990(5) of the Alaska Statutes, the Alaska 
Legislature has defined “household member” to include “adults or 
minors who are engaged in or who have engaged in a sexual 
relationship.”5 
 
 1. ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.990(3) (2006). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id.; ALASKA STAT. § 11.41 (2006). 
 4. See Carpentino v. State, 42 P.3d 1137, 1141 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002). 
 5. ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.990(5) (2006). 
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Although the term “sexual relationship” is used to define the 
scope of “household member,” for purposes of domestic violence 
laws in Alaska, “sexual relationship” is neither defined statutorily 
nor through Alaska case law.6  Other states’ domestic violence 
statutes also define household members as persons who either 
currently, or at sometime in the past, have engaged in a sexual 
relationship.7  Although none of these states’ statutes or case law 
have fully defined the term “sexual relationship,” they provide 
some insight into how section 18.66.990 of the Alaska Statutes may 
be revamped to better reflect the legislative intent behind Alaska’s 
domestic violence legislation. 
Even with this guidance from other states, the bottom line is 
that as section 18.66.990 of the Alaska Statutes currently exists, 
there is little guidance for the courts and even less for the 
individuals impacted by its terminology.  This is problematic 
because being deemed a “household member” has significant 
criminal and civil implications.  The focus of this Comment is to 
analyze the definition and implications of the term “sexual 
relationship” within the context of Alaska’s domestic violence laws. 
As background, Part II explores the etymological, social, and 
legal meaning of the term sexual relationship.  Specifically, it 
addresses two key interpretive questions associated with the term:  
what activity is required to constitute a sexual relationship, and are 
there any temporal requirements to establish a sexual relationship?  
Although some attempts have been made to define sexual 
relationship, Part II concludes that no generally accepted definition 
exists and that neither interpretive question has a generally 
accepted answer. 
Part III examines the term “sexual relationship” as it is used in 
the Alaska domestic violence laws and as the legislature intended 
to use it.  Two diverging conclusions arise from this examination.  
First, although “sexual relationship” is textually undefined, the 
legislative history suggests that only ongoing sexual relationships or 
past sexual relationships that developed over a significant period of 
time qualify under the statute.  Second, while the legislative history 
may suggest that only ongoing relationships qualify, this is by no 
means conclusive; the legislative history is ambiguous as to whether 
a “sexual relationship” requires a minimum length of time.  In light 
of this ambiguity, Part IV identifies and explores the three practical 
implications of the Alaska Legislature’s failure to define “sexual 
relationship”:  interpretive problems that courts may have, the 
 
 6. Id. 
 7. See infra Part II.C. 
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admission of evidence under Alaska Rule of Evidence 404,8 and the 
increased use of protective orders.  Part V then concludes with 
suggestions for change. 
II.  SEXUAL RELATIONSHIP:  
LACKING A CLEAR LEGAL OR SOCIETAL DEFINITION 
The term sexual relationship may seem simple enough on its 
face.  But a closer examination begs at least two key interpretive 
questions.  First, what sort of sexual activity is required to establish 
a sexual relationship?  Is sexual intercourse required, or do other 
forms of sexual activity qualify?  Second, for how long or how 
many times must the requisite sexual activity have occurred to 
constitute a sexual relationship?  Does a casual sexual encounter, 
such as a one-night stand qualify, or need there be consistent and 
recurring sexual activity over a period of time?  If some time 
element is required, where is the line drawn? 
As Part II demonstrates, the term sexual relationship has no 
generally accepted legal or social definition.  More specifically, the 
two key interpretive questions above have no clear answer.  These 
interpretive problems make Alaska’s failure to statutorily define 
“sexual relationship,” discussed below,9 even more problematic:  
with no statutory guidance and no interpretive reference in law or 
society, Alaska courts are left to their own devices to interpret the 
term “sexual relationship.”  
A. How Is “Sexual Relationship” Defined? 
Black’s Law Dictionary defines a number of different types of 
relationships—everything from the attorney-client relationship, to 
the professional relationship, to the parent-child relationship.10  
However, nowhere in Black’s Law Dictionary is sexual relationship 
defined.11  The same is true for the American Heritage Dictionary 
of English Language (“American Heritage Dictionary”).12 
Both Black’s Law Dictionary and the American Heritage 
Dictionary do define a similar term: “sexual relations.”13  The 
American Heritage Dictionary defines “sexual relations” as 
 
 8. ALASKA R. EVID. 404. 
 9. See infra Part III. 
 10. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1314–15 (8th ed.  2004). 
 11. Id. 
 12. See THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4th 
ed. 2006). 
 13. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1314–15 (8th ed. 2004); THE AMERICAN 
HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4th ed. 2006). 
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“sexual intercourse” and “sexual activity between individuals.”14  
Black’s Law Dictionary’s definition is similar: “sexual relations” 
include both “sexual intercourse” and “[p]hysical sexual activity 
that does not necessarily culminate in intercourse.”15  In a social 
and legal sense, then, “sexual relations” do not need to rise to the 
level of sexual intercourse, and can include all forms of sexual 
activity. 
The etymology of the term “relationship” suggests, however, 
that two individuals who have shared sexual relations do not 
necessarily have a sexual relationship.  The term “relationship” 
derives from the word “relation,” which, as discussed above, can 
include sexual intercourse or other physical sexual activity,16 and 
the native English suffix -ship, meaning something that shows or 
possesses a quality.17  It follows that a sexual relationship shows or 
possesses the quality of sexual relations.  More precisely, a sexual 
relationship shows or possesses the quality of sexual intercourse or 
some other form of sexual activity.18 
While this definition of sexual relationship may sound nice, it 
offers very little interpretive guidance.  For one, it is unclear what 
type of sexual activity is required to establish a sexual relationship.  
If, as it was assumed above, the term “sexual relations” can be used 
to interpret sexual relationship, then certain other forms of sexual 
activity may constitute a sexual relationship.  Sexual activity takes 
multiple forms, however, and the definition provides no guidance 
as to where to draw the line.19  It is also possible that not all “sexual 
relations” constitute a sexual relationship.  Must the requisite 
sexual activity occur only once, i.e., a one-night stand, for it to show 
or possess the quality of the requisite sexual intercourse?  Or, must 
a course of sexual conduct ensue for the sexual relations to 
graduate to a sexual relationship?  These questions find no answer 
in the dictionary. 
B. The Clinton Case 
One interesting and well-known case that called into question 
the meaning of a sexual relationship in the legal context was the 
 
 14. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4th ed. 
2006). 
 15. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1314–15 (8th ed. 2004). 
 16. See supra text accompanying notes 10–15. 
 17. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4th ed. 
2006). 
 18. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1314–15 (8th ed. 2004). 
 19. See id.; see also THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH 
LANGUAGE (4th ed. 2006). 
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impeachment trial of President William Jefferson Clinton.20  Paula 
Jones filed a civil lawsuit against President Clinton alleging sexual 
harassment.21  During discovery in Jones v. Clinton, President 
Clinton was deposed and questioned extensively about his 
involvement with former White House intern Monica Lewinsky.22  
During the course of his deposition, President Clinton testified that 
he had “no recollection of having ever been alone with Ms. 
Lewinsky and he denied that he had engaged in an ‘extramarital 
sexual affair,’ in ‘sexual relations,’ or in a ‘sexual relationship’ with 
Ms. Lewinsky.”23  Ms. Lewinsky herself provided an affidavit that 
denied that she and President Clinton had engaged in a “sexual 
relationship.”24  When the President was questioned by his counsel 
as to whether Ms. Lewinsky’s affidavit denying a sexual 
relationship with him was true and accurate, the President 
answered that it was absolutely true.25 
For purposes of the deposition, and at the request of the 
President’s counsel, the term “sexual relations” was defined as: 
A person engages in ‘sexual relations’ when the person 
knowingly engages in or causes . . . contact with the genitalia, 
anus, groin, breasts, inner thigh, or buttocks of any person with 
an intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person . . . .  
‘Contact’ means intentional touching, either directly or through 
clothing.26 
On August 17, 1998, President Clinton testified before a grand 
jury in Washington, D.C., as part of the Office of Independent 
Counsel’s criminal investigation, about his relationship with Ms. 
Lewinsky.27  During that grand jury appearance, the President 
defined the activity between himself and Ms. Lewinsky as 
“inappropriate intimate contact” and stated that “sexual relations 
as defined by himself and ‘most ordinary Americans’ means, for 
the most part, only intercourse.”28  The President himself stated 
that he did not believe that he engaged in “sexual relations” with 
Ms. Lewinsky because he never directly touched those parts of her 
body with the intent to arouse or gratify.29  During his grand jury 
 
 20. See Jones v. Clinton, 36 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1121–22 (E.D. Ark. 1999). 
 21. Id. at 1120. 
 22. Id. at 1121. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at 1121–22. 
 25. Id. at 1122. 
 26. Id. at 1121 n.5  (alteration in original). 
 27. Id. at 1123. 
 28. Id. at 1130. 
 29. Id.  Without expressly ruling on a definition of “sexual relations” or 
whether or not President Clinton and Monica Lewinsky had a “sexual 
04__TRIMMER.DOC 12/17/2007  11:32:01 AM 
2007] “SEXUAL RELATIONSHIP” 243 
testimony, the President stated that “oral sex performed by Ms. 
Lewinsky on himself would not constitute ‘sexual relations’ as that 
term was defined” for his deposition.30 
Even within the context of the specific definition given to 
sexual relations in the President Clinton-Monica Lewinsky matter, 
the terms sexual relations and sexual relationship seem to be used 
interchangeably.31  Does the act of sexual intercourse result in the 
establishment of a sexual relationship?  Conversely, do sexual acts 
which do not culminate in sexual intercourse mean that no sexual 
relationship exists?  As noted by the Indiana Court of Appeals, the 
term “living as a spouse of another” may be based on many things 
depending upon the individual interpreting the facts.  Doesn’t the 
term sexual relationship present the same quandary?32  The bottom 
line is that no generally accepted definition of sexual relationship 
exists. 
C. Most State Legislatures Have Failed to Define “Sexual 
Relationship” 
Many states have failed to define the term sexual relationship, 
or a similar term, in their domestic violence statutes.  Alongside 
Alaska,33 the culprits include Indiana,34 Pennsylvania,35 Michigan,36 
and Vermont.37 
For example, Michigan’s statute defines “family or household 
member” to include “an individual with whom the person is or has 
engaged in a sexual relationship.”38  The Michigan Legislature did 
not, however, provide any further elaboration on what constitutes a 
“sexual relationship.”39 Michigan does not appear to have 
generated any case law relating to either the breadth of section 
400.1501(1)(e) of the Michigan Compiled Laws Annotated or what 
factors are to be reviewed in determining whether the individual is 
 
relationship,” the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Arkansas found the President in contempt for making intentionally false 
statements during his deposition about being alone with Ms. Lewinsky and about 
engaging in sexual relations with Ms. Lewinsky.  Id. at 1130–31. 
 30. Id. at  1130 n.16. 
 31. See id. at 1129–30. 
 32. See Vaughn v. State, 782 N.E.2d 417, 420–21 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). 
 33. See ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.990 (2006). 
 34. See IND. CODE § 35-41-1-10.6(a)(3) (2006). 
 35. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6102 (2006). 
 36. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 400.1501 (2006). 
 37. VT. STAT. tit. 15, § 1101(2) (2005). 
 38. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 400.1501(1)(e)(iv) (2006). 
 39. See id. 
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or has been engaged in a “sexual relationship” with the alleged 
victim. 
Vermont’s statute defines “household member” to include 
“persons who, for any period of time . . . are engaged in or have 
engaged in a sexual relationship, or minors or adults who are dating 
or who have dated.”40  The statute goes on to define “dating” as “a 
social relationship of a romantic nature” and provides factors to 
consider when determining whether a dating relationship exists or 
existed.41  The statute does not, however, further define “sexual 
relationship,” nor does it imply that courts should apply the 
“dating” criteria to the determination of what constitutes a “sexual 
relationship.”42  Additionally, it appears as though the Vermont 
courts have not been presented with an opportunity to determine 
whether, in the absence of applying the factors similar to the 
“dating” parameters set forth in the statute, the definition of 
“sexual relationship” is overbroad.43 
III.  HOUSEHOLD MEMBER AS DEFINED BY “ENGAGED  
IN OR HAVING ENGAGED IN A ‘SEXUAL RELATIONSHIP’” 
The Alaska domestic violence laws do not clearly define the 
outer limits of what constitutes domestic violence.  Crimes 
occurring between two household members are crimes of domestic 
violence; the term “household member,” however, is broad and not 
limited to those living in the same household.44  Though a sexual 
relationship is one way of establishing that two people are 
household members, the Alaska domestic violence laws leave this 
term largely undefined.45  It also fails to put any kind of temporal 
limit on the term; once two people engage in a “sexual 
relationship,” they could theoretically forever be considered 
 
 40. VT. STAT. tit. 15, § 1101(2) (2005) (emphasis added). 
 41. Id.  The factors include “(A) the nature of the relationship;” “(B) the 
length of time the relationship existed;” “(C) the frequency of interaction between 
the parties;” and “(D) the length of time since the relationship was terminated, if 
applicable.”  Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. See State v. Swift, 844 A.2d 802 (Vt. 2004) (finding that complainant and 
defendant both live together and had a sexual relationship where shortly prior to 
the assault they lived together for six months); see also State v. West, 667 A.2d 540 
(Vt. 1995) (finding that complainant and defendant were boyfriend and girlfriend 
at the time of the assault, had two children together, and shared occupancy of the 
same residence). 
 44. ALASKA STAT § 18.66.990(5) (2006). 
 45. See id. (stating only that “‘household member’ includes . . . adults or 
minors who are engaged in or who have engaged in a sexual relationship”). 
04__TRIMMER.DOC 12/17/2007  11:32:01 AM 
2007] “SEXUAL RELATIONSHIP” 245 
“household members” under this statute.46  The legislative history 
shows this term was never meant to be so sweeping,  but a lack of 
clear legislative guidance has left the scope of the term “sexual 
relationship” uncertain. 
A. The Statute Fails to Define “Sexual Relationship” 
On April 20, 1995, House Bill 314, “An Act relating to the 
crime of violating a domestic violence restraining order,” was 
introduced.47  The original bill was only four pages long and was 
directed at revising statutes relating to violations of domestic 
violence restraining orders.48  It also included a prohibition against 
tape recording by defense attorneys of the victim or a witness 
without their prior consent.49  The proposed committee substitute 
bill evolved, however, into a document containing over fifty 
pages.50  The proposed substitute presented a more comprehensive 
approach to domestic violence in Alaska and took much of its 
structure from the Model Code on Domestic and Family 
Violence.51 
Alaska’s definition of “household member” relies heavily on 
the Model Penal Code on Domestic and Family Violence.52  The 
commentary to the Model Code indicates that “household 
member” is not limited to two people who live together: “The 
definition of family or household member is broad.  Cohabitation is 
not a prerequisite for eligibility; and the relationship between the 
victim and the perpetrator need not be current.  The Code 
recognizes that violence may continue after the formal or informal 
relationship has ended.”53  Further, the Code’s definition of 
“household member” includes “adults or minors who are engaged 
 
 46. Id. 
 47. House Journal, 19th Leg., 1st Sess., 1399–1400 (Apr. 20, 1995). 
 48. See id. 
 49. Violating Domestic Violence Orders: Senate Judiciary Committee Notes 
on H.B. 314 Before the S. Comm. On the Judiciary, 19th Leg., tape 96-38, side B 
(Alaska 1996) [hereinafter Committee Notes on H.B. 314], available at 
http://www.legis.state.ak.us/cgi-bin/folioisa.dll/cm19/query=*/doc/%7B@7296% 
7D?. 
 50. Id. (statement of Sen. Robin Taylor, Chairman, S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary). 
 51. Id. (discussing MODEL CODE ON DOMESTIC AND FAMILY VIOLENCE 
(1994)). 
 52. Compare ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.990(5) (2006) (defining “household 
member”), with MODEL CODE ON DOMESTIC AND FAMILY VIOLENCE § 102(2) 
(1994) (defining “family or household member”). 
 53. MODEL CODE ON DOMESTIC AND FAMILY VIOLENCE § 102(2) (1994). 
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in or who have engaged in a sexual relationship.”54  The Code does 
not, however, further define what the term “sexual relationship” 
means in the context of this broad definition and intent.55  Similarly, 
section 18.66.990 of the Alaska Statutes also does not define the 
term “sexual relationship” within the context of the statute.56 
B. Legislative History:  Some Indication of the Scope of “Sexual 
Relationship”? 
The legislative history of section 18.66.990 of the Alaska 
Statutes suggests that not all sexual relationships between two 
individuals make them “household members” for the purposes of 
the domestic violence laws.57  Rather, it appears that for a “sexual 
relationship” to be established, the sexual relationship must have 
been ongoing for or developed over a period of time.  As Jane 
Andreen, Executive Director of the Council on Domestic Violence 
and Sexual Assault, testified before the Senate Judiciary 
Committee, domestic violence is “a series of controlling behaviors 
that lead to physical abuse.”58  Ms. Andreen went on to explain that 
the behaviors she was speaking of “develop and evolve over a 
period of time.”59  Deputy Attorney General Laurie Otto agreed, 
stating that the underlying cause of domestic violence was one of 
power and control in the relationship that tends to escalate from 
verbal abuse.60  By the time the physical violence occurs, Ms. Otto 
concluded, the dynamic of control has been developed in the 
relationship.61 
Taken together, Ms. Andreen and Ms. Otto’s comments 
suggest that the domestic violence laws were enacted to address 
relationships that develop over time.62  Therefore, it follows that 
not all sexual relationships should fall within the ambit of the 
statute.  Only those sexual relationships that have the potential to 
present the problems associated with domestic violence—namely, a 
 
 54. Compare ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.990(5) (defining “household member”), 
with MODEL CODE ON DOMESTIC AND FAMILY VIOLENCE, § 102(2) (1994) 
(defining “family or household member”). 
 55. See MODEL CODE ON DOMESTIC AND FAMILY VIOLENCE § 102(2). 
 56. See ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.990 (2006). 
 57. See Committee Notes on H.B. 314, 19th Leg., tape 96-39, side B (Alaska 
1996), available at http://www.legis.state.ak.us/cgi-bin/folioisa.dll/cm19/query= 
*/doc/%7B@7296%7D?. 
 58. See id. 
 59. Id. at tape 96-39, side B, no. 599. 
 60. Id. at tape 96-39, side B, no. 548. 
 61. Id. 
 62. See id. at tape 96-39, side B. 
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series of actions that establish the dominant partner’s control and 
influence63—should qualify two individuals as “household 
members.”  This would almost certainly mean that a transient 
sexual encounter, such as a one-night stand, does not qualify as a 
“sexual relationship.”  Where the line should be drawn, however, is 
not clear from the statute’s text or the legislative history.64 
The legislative history amplifies another point, as well: a 
“sexual relationship” need not be ongoing at the time of the crime 
to qualify two individuals as “household members.”65  Lauree 
Hugonin, a representative from the Alaska Network on Domestic 
Violence and Sexual Assault, testified that domestic violence does 
not end when a couple has separated.66  In fact, almost seventy-five 
percent of the domestic violence reported to the U.S. Department 
of Justice was inflicted after separation.67  A past sexual 
relationship between two people is therefore likely to qualify the 
two individuals as “household members.”68 
Again, however, the legislative history and statute itself 
provide limited guidance as to what past sexual relationships 
qualify individuals as “household members.”69  For example, it is 
unclear if, under the statute, the term “sexual relationship” has any 
temporal scope.70  Past sexual relationships are included71—but 
does that mean sexual relationships that have happened in the past 
five years?  Ten years?  Longer?  Although the legislative history 
provides no support for a limitless look-back period for individuals 
who “have engaged in a sexual relationship,”72 no clear standards 
exist for determining the appropriate time period. 
 
 63. See id. at tape 96-39, side B, no. 599. 
 64. See ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.990 (2006); Committee Notes on H.B. 314, 19th 
Leg., tape 96-39, side B (Alaska 1996), available at http://www.legis.state.ak.us/cgi-
bin/folioisa.dll/cm19/query=*/doc/%7B@7296%7D?. 
 65. See Committee Notes on H.B. 314, 19th Leg., tape 96-39, side B, no. 548 
(Alaska 1996) (statement of Lauree Hugonin, Member, Alaska Network on 
Domestic Violence and Sexual Assault), available at http://www.legis. 
state.ak.us/cgi-bin/folioisa.dll/cm19/query=*/doc/%7B@7296%7D?. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. See ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.990(5)(D) (2006). 
 69. See Committee Notes on H.B. 314, 19th Leg., tape 96-39, side B, no. 548 
(Alaska 1996) (statement of Lauree Hugonin, member, Alaska Network on 
Domestic Violence and Sexual Assault), available at http://www.legis.state.ak. 
us/cgi-bin/folioisa.dll/cm19/query=*/doc/%7B@7296%7D?; § 18.66.990(5)(d). 
 70. See ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.990(5)(D). 
 71. Id. 
 72. See id. 
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IV.  SO WHAT?:  INTERPRETIVE, CIVIL, AND  
CRIMINAL IMPLICATIONS OF ALASKA’S FAILURE TO DEFINE 
“SEXUAL RELATIONSHIP” 
Although the legislative history suggests some limits on the 
term “sexual relationship,”73 this does very little to address many of 
the practical consequences that may result from leaving “sexual 
relationship” largely undefined.  Part IV identifies and explores the 
interpretive, criminal, and civil consequences of failing to do so. 
A. Problems in Interpretation Arising from the Statute 
With no statutory definition of “sexual relationship,”74 and 
with no clearly accepted legal or societal definition of the term,75 
courts will have a very difficult time determining when a “sexual 
relationship” has been established.  This may lead to arbitrary and 
capricious interpretations and potentially illogical and inconsistent 
results. 
This interpretive problem is best illustrated by an example.  
Imagine two friends who have had intermittent sexual relations 
over the last five years, but no sexual contact at all for the last year 
and no sexual intercourse ever.  An argument ensues between the 
two friends at a concert they attended with a larger group of 
friends.  Later, when the argument escalates, the woman assaults 
the man with a deadly weapon.76  Are the two considered 
“household members” for the purposes of the domestic violence 
laws?77  Indeed, they have had an ongoing relationship and have 
had sexual relations during that relationship.  Their relationship, 
however, has not been defined solely by sexual relations.  
Moreover, they have never had sexual intercourse and their sexual 
relations, which appear to be a series of one-night stands, have not 
occurred in the last year. 
Because judges and juries left to ponder this question find 
little guidance from the statute, arbitrary and capricious 
interpretations may result.  Indiana provides a good example, 
although in a slightly different context, of the dangers that stem 
from such a vaguely worded statute.78  Indiana defines “family or 
 
 73. See supra Part III.B. 
 74. See ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.990 (2006). 
 75. See supra Part II.A–B. 
 76. See ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.220 (2006) (making it a class C felony to 
recklessly place another person “in fear of imminent serious physical injury by 
means of a dangerous instrument”). 
 77. See ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.990. 
 78. See IND. CODE § 35-41-1-10.6 (2006). 
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household member” in its domestic violence laws to include 
someone who “is or was engaged in a sexual relationship with the 
other person.”79  Like Alaska, Indiana has not set forth in its 
statutory language the definition of “sexual relationship” or 
provided any time limit on how far in the past the relationship 
could have occurred.80 
Although there do not appear to have been any challenges to 
the constitutionality of Indiana’s definition of “household 
member,” as defined by “is or was engaged in a sexual relationship 
with the other person,”81 Indiana’s former domestic battery statute82 
was challenged as unconstitutionally vague.  The result in that 
case83 may foretell the outcome of a future challenge to the 
definition of “sexual relationship” in Alaska’s domestic violence 
laws. 
Under Indiana’s former domestic battery statute, a person 
committed domestic battery when they knowingly or intentionally 
touched a person who “is or was living as if a spouse of the other 
person.”84  In Vaughn v. State, Vaughn challenged as 
unconstitutionally vague the Indiana domestic battery statute 
because it did not define what constituted “living as if a spouse of 
another.”85  Specifically, Vaughn argued that “no one can know 
with any reasonable degree of confidence whether they are, or 
were in the past, living with another as a spouse in terms of the 
Domestic Battery Statute.”86  The Indiana Court of Appeals found 
that the domestic battery statute was unconstitutionally vague as it 
applied to Vaughn.87  Specifically, the court found that: 
‘Living as a spouse’ of another person may be based upon many 
things, depending upon the individual interpreting the facts.  It is 
because different people may interpret those words so 
differently that the General Assembly must clarify what 
categories of individuals should receive the protection of the 
 
 79. IND. CODE § 35-41-1-10.6(a)(3) (2006). 
 80. See id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. IND. CODE § 35-42-2-1.3 (1999), invalidated by Vaughn v. State, 782 
N.E.2d 417 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (amended 2003 and 2006). 
 83. See Vaughn, 782 N.E.2d at 418. 
 84. IND. CODE § 35-42-2-1.3 (1999), invalidated by Vaughn v. State, 782 
N.E.2d 417 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (amended 2003 and 2006). 
 85. 782 N.E.2d at 419. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 420–21. 
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statute and conversely what persons should be subject to 
punishment for violation of the statute.88 
To avoid arbitrary and capricious interpretations of its own 
domestic violence laws,89 the Alaska Legislature should heed the 
warning of the Indiana court and clarify the factors that constitute 
a “sexual relationship.” 
With the possibility of arbitrary and capricious interpretation 
comes the further possibility of illogical and inconsistent results.  
For example, the current definition of “household member” under 
section 18.66.990(5)(D) of the Alaska Statutes does not on its face 
prevent a court from looking back on a person’s entire lifetime to 
determine whether he or she fits the category of “household 
member.”90  Thus, two individuals could have one sexual encounter 
in high school, reconnect years later, and still be considered 
household members under the statute.91  An assault by one of the 
individuals against the other would then be considered domestic 
violence, despite not having any ongoing relationship over the last 
twenty years.92  Although this would be contrary to the purpose of 
the domestic violence laws,93 such an interpretation is completely 
feasible as the statute is presently constructed. 
Likewise, consider two strangers that meet at a bar and engage 
in sexual intercourse.  While engaging in sexual intercourse, one 
stranger commits an assault against the other.  Under the current 
definition of section 18.66.990(5)(D) of the Alaska Statutes, these 
individuals may be considered household members under the 
statute.94  Such a broad definition of “household member,” without 
some limitation or look-back period, misconstrues the legislative 
 
 88. Id. at 421.  As an apparent response to the Vaughn case, the Indiana 
General Assembly amended the domestic battery statute I.C. § 35-42-2-1.3 to 
include the factors to be reviewed in determining whether a person “is or was 
living as if a spouse.”  See Act of May 12, 2003,  IND. CODE. § 35-42-2-1.3 (2003); 
Williams v. State, 798 N.E.2d 457, 460 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). 
 89. ALASKA STAT. §§ 18.66.010–990 (2006). 
 90. See ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.990(5)(D) (2006). 
 91. See id. 
 92. See id. 
 93. See supra, Part III.B (explaining that the purpose of ALASKA STAT.            
§ 18.66.990(5)(D) is to prevent domestic violence, which is characterized by 
control or power that can only develop in a relationship that has existed over 
some period of time). 
 94. See ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.990(5)(D) (defining household members as 
“adults . . . who are engaged . . . in a sexual relationship.”). 
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intent behind the statute and does nothing to advance or address 
the issues associated with domestic violence.95 
B. Criminal Implications:  Alaska Rule of Evidence 404(b)(4) 
In 1997, the Alaska Legislature amended Alaska Rule of 
Evidence 404(b) by adding subsection (b)(4).96  Rule 404(b)(4) 
allows the following: 
In a prosecution for a crime involving domestic violence or of 
interfering with a report of a crime involving domestic violence, 
evidence of other crimes involving domestic violence by the 
defendant against the same or another person or of interfering 
with a report of a crime involving domestic violence is 
admissible.  In this paragraph, “domestic violence” and “crime 
involving domestic violence” have the meanings as given in AS 
18.66.990.97 
This evidence rule uses the specific definition of “domestic 
violence” as set forth in section 18.66.990 of the Alaska Statutes.98  
As discussed above,99  that definition encompasses adults or minors 
who are engaged in, or who have engaged in, a “sexual 
relationship.”100  Furthermore, the statute provides a limitless look-
back period for determining whether or not a “sexual relationship” 
existed in order to label someone a “household member.”101  
Although other paragraphs of Evidence Rule 404(b) do place a 
time limit on the look-back period of other bad acts,102  Rule 
404(b)(4) does not have any look-back limitation regarding 
admissibility of evidence of a prior “crime involving domestic 
violence” against a defendant.103 
 
 95. See supra Part III.B (explaining that for control of the relationship to 
polarize in one party, the relationship must have existed over a period of time). 
 96. Act of June 3, 1997, ch. 63, § 22, 20th Leg., 1st Sess. (Alaska 1997) 
(codified as amended at ALASKA R. EVID. 404(b)(4)). 
 97. ALASKA R. EVID. 404(b)(4). 
 98. ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.990(3). 
 99. See supra Part III.A (explaining that crimes occurring between two 
“household members” are crimes of domestic violence, and that two people who 
are or have been engaged in a “sexual relationship” constitute “household 
members”). 
 100. ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.990(5)(D). 
 101. See supra notes 74–77 and accompanying text. 
 102. See ALASKA R. EVID. 404(b)(2)(i) (allowing evidence of defendant’s other 
acts toward same or other child in prosecutions for crimes involving physical or 
sexual abuse of a minor, if the prior offense occurred within the previous ten 
years). 
 103. See ALASKA R. EVID. 404(b)(4): 
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The legislative history of Rule 404(b) provides little to refute 
the absence of a time limitation.104  As one court explained, 
“legislative history of rule 404(b)(4) is scanty” and Rule 404(b) 
“was tacked onto a victim’s rights bill by the House Finance 
Committee with very little discussion.”105  It is interesting to note 
that, similar to the legislative history of section 18.66.990 of the 
Alaska Statutes,106 testimony was provided that “domestic violence 
is the type of thing that happens over and over again, and tends to 
escalate in violence.”107  A further brief discussion regarding the 
amendment was held before the Senate Judiciary Committee;108 
however, the “legislative minutes and files contain no information 
regarding the intended purpose or scope of Rule 404(b)(4), nor any 
other information regarding the need for this rule.”109  In fact, the 
Alaska Court of Appeals has found that “Evidence Rule 404(b)(4) 
is the most far-reaching of the legislative amendments to Rule 
404(b)” and it “applies to a much broader range of evidence” than 
other provisions in Rule 404.110 
The practical implications of Evidence Rule 404(b)(4) are 
great.  In prosecutions for crimes involving domestic violence, this 
rule authorizes the trial court to admit evidence of a defendant’s 
other acts of domestic violence even though the sole relevance of 
those acts is to show that the defendant characteristically commits 
 
In a prosecution for a crime involving a physical or sexual assault or 
abuse of a minor, evidence of other acts by the defendant toward the 
same or another child is admissible if admission of the evidence is not 
precluded by another rule of evidence and if the prior offenses 
i. occurred within the 10 years preceding the date of the offense 
charged; 
ii. are similar to the offense charged; and 
iii. were committed upon persons similar to the prosecuting witness. 
 104. See Committee Notes on H.B. 9 Before H. Comm. on Finance, 20th Leg., 
tape HFC 97-31, side 1, no. 1 – side 2, no. 8 (Alaska 1997) [hereinafter Committee 
Notes on H.B. 9]. 
 105. Bingaman v. State, 76 P.3d 398, 405 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003) (discussing 
Committee Notes on H.B. 9, 20th Leg., tape HFC 97-31, side 1, no. 1 – side 2, no. 8 
(Alaska 1997)). 
 106. ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.990 (2006). 
 107. Bingaman, 76 P.3d at 405 (quoting Committee Notes on H.B. 9, 20th Leg., 
tape HFC 97-31, side 1, no. 5 (Alaska 1997) (statement of Dean Guaneli, Chief 
Assistant Attorney General, Department of Law), available at 
http://www.legis.state.ak.us/cgi-bin/folioisa.dll/cm20/query=*/doc/%7Bt12950%7D?). 
 108. See Victim’s Right to Present at Trial: Hearing on H.B. 9 Before the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 20th Leg., tape 97-26, side A, no. 00 – tape 97-27, side B 
(Alaska 1997). 
 109. Bingaman, 76 P.3d at 406. 
 110. Id. 
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such acts.111  In other words, the defendant’s past acts can be taken 
as circumstantial evidence that the defendant acted true to 
character during the litigated incident.112  Alaska Rule of Evidence 
404(b)(4) specifically exempts prior domestic violence evidence 
“from the normal prohibition against ‘propensity’ evidence.”113 
The Alaska Court of Appeals has found that, on its face, 
Evidence Rule 404(b) “is not limited to evidence of a defendant’s 
pattern of recurring behavior or escalating abuse.”114 
Rule 404(b)(4) adopts such an expansive definition of “domestic 
violence” that it authorizes a court to admit evidence of acts that 
have little or no relevance to establishing a pattern of physical 
abuse.  Nor is Rule 404(b)(4) limited to instances in which the 
purported victim of domestic violence does not testify in support 
of the government’s case.  Rather, the rule applies to all 
prosecutions for crimes of domestic violence.115 
In finding that Evidence Rule 404(b)(4) is so far-reaching, the 
Alaska Court of Appeals specifically commented on the definition 
of “domestic violence” and “household member” as set forth in 
section 18.66.990 of the Alaska Statutes.116  The court stated that: 
It is the second sentence of Rule 404(b)(4) that gives this rule a 
uniquely expansive reach.  This second sentence declares that 
“domestic violence” and “crime involving domestic violence” are 
to be given the meanings ascribed to them in AS 18.66.990.  By 
defining these terms in this way, Rule 404(b)(4) authorizes the 
admission of evidence concerning acts that have little or nothing 
to do with the issues that normally would be litigated at a trial 
for domestic assault.117 
In response to what the Court of Appeals deemed Rule 
404(b)(4)’s “uniquely expansive reach,” the court found that the 
principle that irrelevant evidence is inadmissible118 limits the 
admissibility of evidence under Evidence Rule 404(b)(4).119  To 
clarify the interplay between Alaska Rules of Evidence 402 and 
404(b)(4), the Court of Appeals gave the following scenario: 
Thus, if a man is prosecuted for beating his wife, evidence of 
other assaults on his wife or other girlfriends might be admissible 
under Evidence Rule 404(b)(4) because these other assaults 
arguably tend to prove a relevant trait of the defendant’s 
 
 111. Id. at 401. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 406. 
 115. Id. 
 116. ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.990 (2006). 
 117. Bingaman, 76 P.3d at 406–07. 
 118. See ALASKA R. EVID. 402. 
 119. Bingaman, 76 P.3d at 410. 
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character.  But evidence of the man’s reckless driving or incest 
would be excluded by Evidence Rule 402 (even though these 
acts might qualify as “crimes involving domestic violence” under 
AS 18.66.990), because these acts are not relevant to any 
pertinent character trait of the defendant.120 
Although the Court of Appeals’ limiting scenario appears to 
work well when a defendant fits squarely within the meaning of 
“household member,”121 the potentially broad statutory definition 
of “sexual relationship” leaves open the possibility of injustice for 
certain defendants.  Most problematically, injustice may prevail on 
a defendant who is deemed a “household member” under the 
“sexual relationship” subsection but is not considered a “household 
member” under the legislative intent of the domestic violence 
laws.122 
For instance, a man and a woman meet in a bar and have a 
one-night stand, during which they engage in sexual intercourse.  
The next morning, a fight erupts between them and the man puts 
the woman in a stranglehold, thereby assaulting her.  Under section 
18.66.990(5)(D) of the Alaska Statutes, the two are “household 
members” because they arguably had a “sexual relationship.”123  
The State then prosecutes the assault, which is a crime 
encompassed by the “domestic violence” definition of section 
18.66.990 of the Alaska Statutes.124  At the defendant’s trial, the 
State asserts that under Alaska Evidence Rule 404(b)(4), it will 
introduce evidence of two separate incidents where the defendant 
placed his ex-wives into strangleholds when provoked by 
arguments.  The incidents occurred during the course of each 
marriage, one incident three years ago and one twelve years ago.  
Should the evidence be admitted under the prevailing case law? 
Based upon the Alaska Evidence Rule 402/404(b)(4) analysis 
set forth by the Court of Appeals in Bingaman v. State, a trial judge 
faced with this question would have to look at a number of factors.  
First, how strong is the government’s evidence that the defendant 
actually committed the other acts?125  Second, what character traits 
do the other acts tend to prove?126  Finally, is this character trait 
relevant to any material issue in the case?127  How strongly do the 
 
 120. Id. at 413. 
 121. ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.990(5) (2006). 
 122. ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.990(5)(D) (2006). 
 123. Id. 
 124. ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.990(3) (2006). 
 125. Bingaman v. State, 76 P.3d 398, 415 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003). 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
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defendant’s other acts tend to prove this trait?128  In answering 
these questions, the trial judge is directed by the Court of Appeals 
to analyze whether the defendant’s other acts demonstrate the 
same type of situational behavior as the crime currently charged.129 
In the above scenario, the State can successfully meet all three 
factors.  When challenged and embroiled in an argument, the State 
would argue, this defendant responds by assaulting the person with 
whom he is arguing, and the defendant’s mode of assault is the 
stranglehold. 
The implications of 404(b)(4) come into play because of the 
“sexual relationship” component of “household member.” A 
defendant under these circumstances is subjected to the admission 
of prior bad acts evidence that would likely be excluded had the 
same assault occurred between the defendant and a friend with 
whom he had not had sexual intercourse. 130  This would arguably be 
the case even if the defendant had similar strangulation incidents 
with other friends. 
Since the term “sexual relationship” has not been defined in 
the context of the domestic violence laws,131 its breadth 
encompasses both situations and individuals not intended to be 
protected by, or targeted by, the domestic violence laws or the 
evidentiary rules.  This frustrates the true intent of both pieces of 
legislation. 
C. Civil Implications:  Protective Orders 
Section 18.66.100 of the Alaska Statutes authorizes a person 
who is, or has been, a victim of a crime involving domestic violence 
to file a petition for a protective order against a household 
member.132  Under the provisions of a protective order, the court 
may order a multitude of remedies.133  Furthermore, in seeking a 
protective order under this section, it is important to note that only 
a criminal act is required, not a conviction.134 
In the context of a protective order, the following scenario 
implicates the “household member” definition as it relates to the 
“sexual relationship.”  Imagine two co-workers who have a sexual 
 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. ALASKA R. EVID. 404(B). 
 131. See supra Part III.A. 
 132. ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.100(a) (2006). 
 133. ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.100–110 (2006). 
 134. “The legislature consistently uses the phrase ‘crimes involving domestic 
violence’ in a context which indicates that the reference is to a criminal act, not a 
conviction.”  State v. Bingaman, 991 P.2d 227, 230 (Alaska Ct. App. 1999). 
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encounter one night.  Co-worker 1 wants to pursue a relationship; 
Co-worker 2, however, is not interested and does not reciprocate 
after the initial sexual encounter.  Co-worker 1 then begins sending 
e-mails threatening to expose the sexual encounter to a loved one.  
In response, Co-worker 2 sends an e-mail that Co-worker 1 
construes as threatening bodily harm.  Under section 11.41.270 of 
the Alaska Statutes, Co-worker 2 may potentially have committed 
stalking in the second degree.135  Co-worker 1 could thus seek a 
protective order pursuant to section 18.66.110 of the Alaska 
Statutes, because, based upon their one-time sexual encounter, the 
two would likely be deemed “household members” and the co-
worker has committed a crime of domestic violence.136  Since the 
two are co-workers, it would not be unrealistic for the court to 
direct the respondent from going to the individuals’ place of 
employment, thereby barring the respondent from his or her job. 
The classification of these individuals as “household 
members,”137 based potentially on one sexual encounter, makes the 
issuance of a protective order in this scenario a possibility.  A 
legitimate basis may exist for obtaining a protective order against 
someone who has committed the crime of stalking against another 
person; allowing such an application by an individual who is not in 
a significant domestic relationship, however, is less justifiable.  The 
legislative intent behind the issuance of protective orders in the 
domestic violence arena is not furthered by encompassing 
individuals who have had only casual encounters in the definition 
of “household member.” 
V.  TOWARD A CLEARER DEFINITION OF “SEXUAL 
RELATIONSHIP”: SUCCESSFUL LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL 
ATTEMPTS TO NARROW THE SCOPE OF A “SEXUAL 
RELATIONSHIP” 
Legislatures in Minnesota and Oregon have provided clearer 
definitions of “sexual relationship,” or a similar term, in their 
domestic violence laws.138  Courts, including an Alaska court,139 
have suggested some interpretive criteria as well.  Taken together, 
the Minnesota and Oregon statutes and the attempts by courts to 
 
 135. ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.41.280(a), (b)(3)(F) (2006). 
 136. See McComas v. Kirn, 105 P.3d 1130 (Alaska 2005). 
 137. ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.990(5)(D) (2006). 
 138. See MINN. STAT. § 518B.01(2)(b)(7) (2006); OR. REV. STAT. § 107.705(e) 
(2005). 
 139. See Richart  v. State, No. A-7619, 2001 WL 1299120, at *1–2 (Alaska Ct. 
App. Oct. 24, 2001). 
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clarify the meaning of “sexual relationship” provide models for the 
Alaska Legislature if it chooses to more clearly define “sexual 
relationship.”140 
A. Legislative Attempts 
Legislatures in Minnesota and Oregon have used different 
avenues to attempt to better define “sexual relationship” in their 
domestic violence laws. 
In Minnesota, like Alaska, the term “household member” 
includes “persons involved in a significant romantic or sexual 
relationship.”141 Unlike Alaska,142 however, Minnesota’s statute 
provides further guidance as to what the term “persons involved in 
a significant romantic or sexual relationship,” means: 
In determining whether persons are or have been involved in a 
significant romantic or sexual relationship under clause (7), the 
court shall consider the length of time of the relationship; type of 
relationship; frequency of interaction between the parties; and, if 
the relationship has terminated, length of time since 
termination.143 
Minnesota’s definition of “sexual relationship” has a number 
of important differences from Alaska’s definition.  Most 
importantly, Minnesota’s definition explicitly recognizes that it will 
be the job of a court to determine whether parties in a case “are or 
have been involved in a significant romantic or sexual relationship” 
under the statute.144  Instead of leaving courts with no criteria with 
which to define the term, however, the Minnesota Legislature has 
provided significant guidance as to what constitutes a “sexual 
relationship.”145  Importantly, the Minnesota Legislature appears to 
have addressed the two primary problems associated with the 
Alaska statute:  casual sexual encounters and a limitless look-back 
period. 
A number of limiting factors address and appear to exclude 
casual sexual relationships.  First, the Minnesota statute makes 
clear that only “significant” romantic relationships qualify.146  
Almost certainly, this narrows the “household member” definition 
by excluding one-night encounters, which have no significance at 
all.  “Significant” may also exclude as “household members” long-
 
 140. ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.990(5)(D) (2006). 
 141. MINN. STAT. § 518B.01(2)(b)(7) (2006). 
 142. ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.990(5)(D) (2006). 
 143. MINN. STAT. § 518B.01(2)(b)(7) (2006). 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
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term friends who have only infrequent sexual encounters.  Two 
friends who have had sexual intercourse only twice in five years 
may be said to have a “significant” friendship, but their sexual 
relationship is far from significant. 
If the word “significant” does not immediately exclude casual 
sexual encounters from Minnesota’s definition of sexual 
relationship, the other limiting factors should.147  Courts may 
consider the “length of time of the relationship; type of 
relationship; [and] frequency of interaction between the parties.”148  
Courts, in other words, must look not only at the period of time 
over which the relationship has stretched, but also at the number of 
times the two parties have interacted in that period. This 
requirement apparently addresses the situation where two friends 
have had an ongoing relationship, but only infrequent sexual or 
romantic encounters.  Furthermore, the “type” of relationship 
matters.149  Thus, courts may not ignore the difference between a 
long-standing romantic bond and more transient sexual encounters. 
Unlike Alaska,150 Minnesota’s domestic violence law, on its 
face, does not provide a limitless look-back period for sexual 
relationships.151 To be sure, the statute does include past 
relationships, as it covers “persons [who] are or have been involved 
in a significant romantic or sexual relationship.”152  In considering 
whether two individuals who have had a sexual relationship in the 
past qualify as “household members,” however, the statute 
commands the court to look at the “length of time since 
termination.”153  Clearly, then, the court must be cognizant of time 
considerations.  And while the statute could offer more guidance as 
to what lengths of time are sufficient, the statute at least focuses 
courts on the key issue:  not all past sexual relationships qualify as 
“sexual relationships” for the purposes of domestic violence. 
In Oregon, which also defines “household member” to include 
partners that have had a sexual relationship,154 the legislature has 
not gone as far as Minnesota in assisting courts’ evaluations of 
whether there is a “sexual relationship.”  The Oregon Legislature 
has, however, squarely addressed one issue that neither the Alaska 
nor Minnesota Legislatures have: the limitless look-back period.  
 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. See ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.990(5)(D) (2006). 
 151. MINN. STAT. § 518B.01(2)(b)(7) (2006). 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. OR. REV. STAT. § 107.705(e) (2005). 
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To this end, in the Family Abuse and Prevention Act, the Oregon 
Legislature defines “family or household member” to include 
“[p]ersons who have been involved in a sexually intimate 
relationship with each other within two years immediately preceding 
the filing by one of them of a petition under ORS 107.710.”155  
Unlike Minnesota, which provides courts with interpretive 
principles to determine whether a past relationship falls under the 
statue,156 and Alaska, which provides no guidance on the point 
whatsoever,157 the Oregon Legislature has left no doubt.  Any 
sexual relationship that terminated more than two years ago is 
statutorily excluded. 
Less clear is whether the Oregon Legislature’s insertion of the 
word “intimate”158 makes its statutory definition of “sexual 
relationship” any more specific than Alaska’s definition.159  
Arguably, “sexually intimate relationship”160 excludes casual sexual 
encounters that are transient and/or meaningless, as compared to 
intimate and/or romantic.  The Oregon Legislature, at least, has 
made clear that not all sexual relationships are included in the 
domestic violence laws. 
B. Court Attempts 
Pennsylvania does not use the term “sexual relationship” in its 
definition of “family or household member” but uses the term 
“sexual or intimate partners.”  Specifically, the Pennsylvania 
Protection from Abuse Act defines “family or household 
members” to include “current or former sexual or intimate 
partners.”161 
It is clear from the statutory definition that the Pennsylvania 
Legislature did not further define the meaning of sexual or 
intimate partners; however, some Pennsylvania case law touches on 
a definition.  One extremely disturbing opinion from the Court of 
Common Pleas, Centre County, found that the victim of an 
ongoing sexual molestation, i.e., an unwilling person in a non-
consensual encounter, is deemed to be a “sexual partner” with her 
abuser for the purposes of seeking a protection order.162  The 
 
 155. Id. (emphasis added). 
 156. MINN. STAT. § 518B.01(2)(b)(7) (2006). 
 157. ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.990(5)(D) (2006). 
 158. OR. REV. STAT. § 107.705(e) (2005). 
 159. ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.990(5)(D) (2006). 
 160. OR. REV. STAT. § 107.705(e) (2005) (emphasis added). 
 161. 23 PA. STAT. ANN. § 6102(a) (2007). 
 162. Shay v. Scott, No. 05-4048, 2006 WL 4091470, at *5 (Pa. D. & C.4th Mar. 
15, 2006). 
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Pennsylvania Superior Court overturned the finding, defining the 
term “partner” within the context of title 23, section 6102(a) of the 
Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes.163 The superior court 
specifically found that the “Act does not define the term ‘partners,’ 
and it is otherwise unclear whether this term includes the victim of 
a sex crime.  Thus, the term ‘partners’ is not free of all 
ambiguity.”164  The court went on to discuss the following: 
As we have already made clear, [the legislature’s] intent was to 
prevent domestic violence and to promote peace and safety 
within domestic, familial and/or romantic relationships. 
  There is certainly no domestic, familial or romantic 
relationship created between an assailant and a victim of a sex 
assault.  By contrast, the persons who undoubtedly fit the act’s 
definition of family or household members– e.g., spouses, 
parents, children, relatives, paramours, and persons who 
undertake romantic relationships–typically share some 
significant degree of domestic, familial and/or intimate 
interdependence. . . . In sum, the persons protected by the act as 
family or household members have a connection rooted in 
blood, marriage, family standing, or a chosen romantic 
relationship. 
  There simply is no connection created by an assault. . . . An 
assailant and a victim do not, by virtue of a crime, suddenly have 
a bond regarding the private matters of life. They have no 
interface concerning personal issues and concerns. . . . Rather, 
sexual or intimate partners are persons who have mutually 
agreed to enter such relationships.165 
The superior court went on to state that “our interpretation of 
[partners] means that persons who choose to have intimate sexual 
relationships are within the purview of domestic relations law.”166  
Although the Pennsylvania Superior Court attempted to 
adequately define the term “partners” for the purposes of domestic 
violence and domestic relations, it left open the meaning of 
“intimate or sexual relationships.” 
The Alaska Court of Appeals was faced with a very similar set 
of facts in relation to whether a sexual assault victim and a 
perpetrator had a “sexual relationship” under section 18.66.990(3) 
of the Alaska Statutes.167  In Richart v. State, the Court of Appeals 
was asked to determine whether a defendant and his victim of a 
 
 163. Scott v. Shay, 928 A.2d 312, 314–16 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007). 
 164. Id. at 315. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. at 316. 
 167. Richart  v. State, No. A-7619, 2001 WL 1299120, at *1–2 (Alaska Ct. App. 
Oct. 24, 2001). 
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sexual assault were considered “household members” on the basis 
that they were “engaged in a sexual relationship” due to the single 
prior act of forced sexual contact that was the basis of the sexual 
assault charge.168 The Alaska Court of Appeals commented, 
without resolving the issue, that a single prior act of forced or non-
consensual contact does not appear to establish a “sexual 
relationship.”169 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Currently, under section 18.66.990 of the Alaska Statutes, the 
definition of “household members” within the domestic violence 
context includes adults or minors who are engaged in, or who have 
engaged in, a sexual relationship.170  To date, neither in Alaska nor 
elsewhere has the term “sexual relationship” been defined by 
statute or case law.  In the absence of defining parameters, 
individuals who have engaged in casual sexual encounters, which 
may or may not have culminated in sexual intercourse, can be 
found to be “household members” within Alaska’s domestic 
violence context.  Additionally, Alaska places a limitless look-back 
period allowing “sexual relationships” decades old to qualify 
individuals as “household members.”  Under Alaska Evidence 
Rule 404(b)(4),171 this far-reaching label allows otherwise 
potentially excludable prior bad acts evidence to be used against a 
criminal defendant at trial.  It may also allow a protection order to 
be issued against an individual who is not, nor truly was, in any 
type of a domestic relationship with the petitioner.  Such an order 
could have a devastating impact upon a respondent’s life if the 
protective order barred the individual from a location like his or 
her place of employment. 
The Alaska Legislature has multiple options available to it to 
ensure that the definition of “sexual relationship” encompasses 
only those individuals that the domestic violence laws are meant to 
protect and target.  The Minnesota Statute set forth above provides 
some solutions that the Alaska Legislature could take to provide a 
more specific definition for “sexual relationship” under Alaska 
Statute section 18.66.990(5)(D).172  First, the qualifier “significant” 
could be added to “sexual relationship” in order to eliminate the 
casual sexual encounter as a basis for the label “household 
 
 168. Id. at *2. 
 169. Id. 
 170. ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.990 (2006). 
 171. ALASKA R. EVID. 404(b)(4). 
 172. ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.990(5)(D) (2006). 
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member.”173  Additionally, as Minnesota directs in the body of its 
statute, the Alaska Legislature can direct the courts to consider the 
length of time of the relationship, the type of relationship, the 
frequency of interaction between the parties, or, if the relationship 
has ended, the length of time since termination.174 
As an alternative to the last inquiry, length of time since 
termination, the Alaska Legislature could take Oregon’s approach 
and specify a length of time for the look-back period.175  Of course, 
the Alaska Legislature could always opt to specifically define what 
the term “sexual relationship” means under section 18.66.990 of the 
Alaska Statutes.176 
 
 173. See MINN. STAT. § 518B.01(2)(b) (2006). 
 174. Id. 
 175. OR. REV. STAT. § 107.705(e)75 (2005). 
 176. ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.990 (2006). 
